

# Online Appendix

## “Political Competition and State Capacity Evidence from a Land Allocation Program in Mexico”

March 18, 2022

### A Data sources and variable construction details

We use data on the spatial location of localities and municipal headquarters from the INEGI.<sup>23</sup> We use administrative data on the location of *ejidos* and their mapping to localities from Mexico’s land certification program, or *Programa de Certificación de Derechos Ejidales y Titulación de Solares*, (PROCEDE) from the [Gobierno de la República Mexicana \(2013\)](#). The number of beneficiaries at the time of allocation, area originally allocated, and allocation date of each *ejido* come from the *Padrón e Historial de Núcleos Agrarios* (PHINA) at the [Registro Agrario Nacional \(2012\)](#).<sup>24</sup> Appendix Figure A-2 plots the frequency of the allocation of *ejidos* over time. In spite of the well-known peak in *ejido* allocation that occurred during the Lázaro Cárdenas administration (1934–40), land reform was active with close to 1,000 *ejidos* granted every quinquennium until the end of the century.

To compute the distance of *ejidos* from their municipal headquarters, we use the population-weighted distance of the *ejido* localities from the municipal headquarters (see Appendix Figure A-3 for details on the computation).<sup>25</sup> When accounting for the use of roads to compute these distances, we use the trace of roads from the Digital Chart of the World of 1992 and we compute the overall distance of each locality from its municipal headquarters adding up two different figures. First, the Euclidean distance from the locality to the closest point in a road that leads to the municipal headquarters, and second, the length of the segment that connects such point to the municipal headquarters following the road path.

Electoral data to compute vote shares of the PRI and opposition parties comes from the electoral database at the [Centro de Investigación para el Desarrollo A.C \(CIDAC\) \(2012\)](#).<sup>26</sup> In additional exercises, we further classify the opposition as “friendly” or “unfriendly” to the PRI. Friendly parties are those classified as “parastatal” parties controlled by the state and only opposing the PRI in appearance ([Molinar & Weldon, 1990](#); [Peiro, 1998](#)). The classification of each party listed in our database is shown in Table A-2.

Rainfall data to construct our instrumental variable of the numbers of months with drought during the 1950s comes from a freedom of information request to the [Comision Nacional del Agua \(CONAGUA\) \(2013\)](#).<sup>27</sup>

We construct *ejido*-level measures of climate and geography (e.g., altitude, area, rainfall, soil humidity) using corresponding data from the [Instituto Nacional de Estadística y Geografía \(INEGI\) \(2013\)](#).<sup>28</sup> We also use information about the land quality of the allocated *ejidos* from two different sources ([Food and Agriculture Organization \(FAO\), 2014](#); [U.S. Department of Agriculture, 2014](#)). First, we use the inherent land quality index database reported by the U.S. Department of Agriculture that rates soil resilience and performance

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<sup>23</sup>See, <http://www.inegi.org.mx/est/contenidos/Proyectos/ccpv/cpv2000/>

<sup>24</sup>The data were scraped from <http://phina.ran.gob.mx/phina2/> by Melissa Dell, who generously shared it with us.

<sup>25</sup>We use population figures from the 2000 Census, once all *ejidos* were allocated.

<sup>26</sup>Originally here: [http://www.cidac.org/eng/Electoral\\_Database.php](http://www.cidac.org/eng/Electoral_Database.php)

<sup>27</sup>More info at <https://www.gob.mx/conagua>

<sup>28</sup>Additional info here, <http://www.inegi.org.mx/geo/contenidos/topografia/default.aspx>

around the world based on climate and geological factors.<sup>29</sup> These two dimensions on a three-level scale (low, medium and high resilience and performance) comprise a nine-level land quality index, ranging from the best type with high performance and resilience (class 1) to the worst type, with low performance and resilience (class 9).<sup>30</sup> To interpret this classification as a land quality measure ranging from 1 to 9, we recalculate so that higher values indicate higher land quality. Second, we construct a soil quality measure using data from the UN Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) that takes into account the major environmental constraints and opportunities for agricultural production.<sup>31</sup> The soil quality measure is a seven-level scale, which we turn into a dummy variable for ease of interpretation.<sup>32</sup> Finally, we rely on shapefiles of land-use published by the [Instituto Nacional de Estadística y Geografía \(INEGI\) \(2007\)](#) to compute agricultural land available for redistribution at different distances from municipal headquarters. Details on the use of these maps are presented in Appendix Figure A-4.

We borrow information on the number of federal, state and municipal bureaucrats during the 40s from [Garfias \(2018\)](#), who computes the number of public servants at the municipality level using micro level data from population censuses.

We also use INEGI's historical catalog of localities to construct several variables: municipal log population in 1900 and 1960, municipal headquarters population in 1960, and the number of *ranchos* and *haciendas* [Instituto Nacional de Estadística y Geografía \(INEGI\) \(2011\)](#).<sup>33</sup> We additionally construct an index of municipal social capital using data from the 1994 Mexican directory of civil organizations ([Secretaría de Gobernación, 1994](#)). In particular, we consider the number of organizations of human rights, popular fronts and peasants.

To explore the relationship between the distance from municipal headquarters and public goods provision, we leverage 1990 and 2000 census data from INEGI on the share of households with access to piped water, drainage, and electricity. We also use the georeferenced universe of public schools in the 2011 census to calculate the number of schools (per capita) founded before 1990 and 2000 and located within 5kms of each locality ([Instituto Nacional de Estadística y Geografía \(INEGI\), 1990, 2000; Gobierno de la República Mexicana, 2011](#)).

We report the summary statistics of the main variables in Appendix Table A-3 and of other variables in Appendix Table A-4. There is significant variation in our baseline distance of *ejidos* to their municipal headquarters (mean of 19 km and standard deviation of 22), as well as on our expected political competition variables. The average opposition vote share was around 16% (standard deviation of 14%), and there were roughly 0.5 events of social and political discontent across municipalities. Lastly, consistent with historical accounts about the harsh droughts that Mexico suffered during the 1950s, the average number of dry months is around 59 (standard deviation of 25).

## A.1 Coding of events of social and political discontent during the 1960s

To measure social and political discontent during the 1960s, we relied on all issues of Mexico's two main newspapers, *Excelsior* and *El Universal*, from January 1st, 1960 to

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<sup>29</sup>[http://www.nrcs.usda.gov/wps/portal/nrcs/detail/soils/use/?cid=nrcs142p2\\_054011](http://www.nrcs.usda.gov/wps/portal/nrcs/detail/soils/use/?cid=nrcs142p2_054011)

<sup>30</sup>See [http://www.nrcs.usda.gov/wps/portal/nrcs/detail/soils/edu/college/?cid=nrcs142p2\\_054029](http://www.nrcs.usda.gov/wps/portal/nrcs/detail/soils/edu/college/?cid=nrcs142p2_054029)

<sup>31</sup><http://data.fao.org/map?entryId=c1f62b50-88fd-11da-a88f-000d939bc5d8&tab=metadata>

<sup>32</sup>Specifically, we code the first five categories of the scale (1, too cold/dry; 2, low suitability; 3, unreliable rain; 4, slope higher than 30 degrees; 5, degraded), which capture soil of poor quality, as a 0, and the last two categories (6, medium/low rain-fed potential; 7, high rain-fed potential), which capture soil of good quality, as a 1.

<sup>33</sup>We accessed the data from <http://www.inegi.org.mx/geo/contenidos/geoestadistica/catalogoclaves.aspx>

December 31st, 1969. We searched on the articles' title, subtitle, and main text to identify all news about protests, strikes, demonstrations, riots and marches for every municipality.

When the articles do not mention a particular location or when they refer to national or state-level event, we err on the conservative side and avoid assign it to a particular municipality. If instead a given municipality (or municipalities) are listed, we then coded the corresponding municipality as affected by the event.

The following words were used to identify news articles about events of social and political discontent:

- Protestas (protests) and the n-gram "protest\*"
- Huelgas (strikes) and the n-gram "huelg\*"
- Manifestaciones (demonstrations) and the n-gram "manifesta\*"
- Disturbios (riots) and the n-gram "Disturbio\*"
- Marchas (marches) and the n-gram "March\*"

Each of the resulting news articles were then verified to identify the municipality of occurrence.

Appendix Figure A-5 shows the distribution of events of social and political discontent over time. The most common words in the resulting set of articles (excluding common Spanish expressions and distinguishing capital letters) are presented in Table A-5

## B Additional robustness checks

First, we investigate whether the increase in the distance of allocated *ejidos* varies with the nature of the political opposition faced by the PRI. Some of the opposition parties were friendly to the PRI.<sup>34</sup> These parties are often referred to as "parastatal," as they were presumably controlled by the state but served the purpose of presenting an image of political diversity and openness. Their presence potentially prevented the development of true competition. Presumably, the development of such parties was particularly important in places where the PRI expected some real political competition. Thus, we expect a significantly smaller but still positive interaction with the vote share of friendly opposition parties. Appendix Table A-10 confirms that both effects are positive and statistically significant, but the effect of unfriendly parties is between two to three times that of friendly parties (e.g., 3.039 km versus 1.419 km in column 4). The p-value of the test of the inequality of these coefficients is 0.13.

Second, we explore whether our OLS- and IV-DiD estimates are biased by the strength of local rural elites. For example, (Sinkler, 2014) argues that fewer *ejidos* were distributed in municipalities where elites were more powerful. This could have led to more peasant dissidence and thus greater expected political competition, but also to *ejido* allocations farther from municipal headquarters. Moreover, the strength of rural elites likely shaped their financial situation and thus their ability to deal with the droughts they endured during the 1950s. Panel A of Appendix Table A-11 controls for the number of large landholdings—*ranchos* and *haciendas*—in each municipality and the interaction with the post-1960 indicator. The results are similar in size and statistical significance to those reported in Tables A-8 and 1, thus suggesting that the strength of the rural elites is unlikely to drive our findings.

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<sup>34</sup>See Appendix Table A-2 for the classification of parties.

Third, since the granting of *ejidos* was largely determined at the state level and droughts are likely to be spatially clustered, another concern is that our results are driven by state-level confounders shaping distinct patterns in *ejido* distance after 1960. To address these potential concerns, in Panel B of Appendix Table A-11 we report robustness to including interactions of the post-1960 indicator with state-fixed effects, as well as state-specific quadratic time trends.

Fourth, we repeat our exercises using distance measures that account for the terrain's elevation profile or the available roads to reach municipal headquarters in Appendix Table A-12.<sup>35</sup>

## Appendix References

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<sup>35</sup>For details on the computation of these distances, see Panel B of Figure A-3.

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
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
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**Figure A-1: Evolution of new land endowments, and restitutions**



Notes: The number of events refers to the number of approved petitions. Authors' calculation with data from the *Padrón e Historial de Núcleos Agrarios*


**Figure A-2: Allocation of *ejidos* over time**



Notes: Number of allocated *ejidos*. Authors' calculation with data from the *Padrón e Historial de Núcleos Agrarios - PHINA*. Baseline sample of municipalities with political information data.

## Figure A-3: Spatial distribution of *ejidos* and computation of distances


Panel A: Example of location and distribution of main geographical features in the administrative data



This panel presents an excerpt of the location of ejidos and the administrative divisions of Mexico. The country is divided into 31 states and its capital city. States, at the same time, are divided into municipalities. There are 2,448 municipalities in which there exist around 200,000 population centers or Localities. Only one of the localities in each municipality serves as municipality seat.

Panel B: Computation of distances of *ejido* from municipality head

Consider a hypothetical municipality similar to those presented in Panel A, with *ejidos* that may include multiple localities. This municipality has one *ejido* ( $E$ ) with two localities:  $L_1$  and  $L_2$ . Each locality has a number of inhabitants given by  $\text{Population}(L_1)$  and  $\text{Population}(L_2)$ , respectively. Let  $d_1$  and  $d_2$  denote the distances of these localities from the municipal headquarters. We compute different measures of  $d_1$  and  $d_2$  depending on whether or not they account for terrain and roads as illustrated in the following figures:



Using each of these options we defined the distance of *ejido* ( $E$ ) from the municipal headquarters as:


$$d(E, \text{Mun headquarter}) = d_1 \left( \frac{\text{Population}(L_1)}{\text{Population}(L_1) + \text{Population}(L_2)} \right) + d_2 \left( \frac{\text{Population}(L_2)}{\text{Population}(L_1) + \text{Population}(L_2)} \right).$$

In other words, it is the population-weighted average distance from the municipal headquarters to the localities within *ejido*  $E$ .

Notes: The distance from a locality to the municipal headquarters accounting for elevation terrain profile (Option 2) penalizes the minimum Euclidean distance (Option 1) when there are changes in altitude between them. The distance via DCW roads (Option 3) accounts for the use of roads to reach the municipal headquarters. The trace of those roads comes from the Digital Chart of the World of 1992 and the overall distance of each locality from its municipal headquarters is computed adding up two different figures. First, the Euclidean distance from the locality to the closest point in a road that leads to the municipality head, and second, the length of the segment that connects such point to the municipal headquarters following the road path.



**Figure A-4: Calculating the stock of ejidos and land available for redistribution**




In Table 2, we present our baseline results after controlling for the stock of agricultural land still available for redistribution and the amount of *ejido* land distributed by quartiles of distance from the municipal headquarters. In order to compute these measures, we divide the country into a synthetic grid of 2km by 2km. We then calculate the distance from the centroid of each one of these grid cells to the municipal headquarters that corresponds to the municipality where most of the grid cell's area falls. We then classify the grid cells into four quartiles using the distribution of the distances within each municipality. We then create a panel at the grid-year level ( $\approx 33'350,000$  observations) in which we compute for each grid cell the fraction of the grid area distributed in the form of *ejidos* as well as the agricultural land up to year  $t$ . We define agricultural land as the land that was not classified as desert or water body according to INEGI's shapefiles of land use. Finally, we aggregate these measures at the municipality-year level as follows,

$$\{\text{Land Available at Distance Quartile } q\}_{m,t} = \frac{\sum_{c=1}^{grids_{m,q}} \text{Agricultural Land}_{c,q,m,t} - \sum_{c=1}^{grids_{m,q}} \text{Area of ejidos}_{c,q,m,t-1}}{\sum_{c=1}^{grids_{m,q}} \text{Total area}_{c,q,m}}$$

$$\{\text{Stock of land granted at Distance Quartile } q\}_{m,t} = \frac{\sum_{c=1}^{grids_{m,q}} \text{Area of ejidos}_{c,q,m,t-1}}{\sum_{c=1}^{grids_{m,q}} \text{Total area}_{c,q,m}}$$


where  $c$  indexes grid cells,  $q$  distance quartiles,  $m$  municipalities, and  $t$  years.  $grids_{m,q}$  is the total number of grid cells in municipality  $m$  that belongs to distance quartile  $q$ .

Figure A-5: Number of social and political events reflecting discontent per year




Notes: Total number of social and political events reflecting discontent per year as reported in news articles referring to protests, strikes, demonstrations, riots and marches (excluding national and state-level protests for which the municipality where they occurred is not specified). Authors' calculation with news from *Excelsior* and *El Universal*.

**Figure A-6: Opposition Vote share and Events of Social and Political Discontent**



Notes: Figures represent bin-scatters at the municipality level. Opposition vote share = 1 – PRI vote share. The number of events reflecting social and political discontent are counted during the period 1960-1969 using references to related events in two Mexican newspapers with national coverage: *El Universal* and *Excelsior*, further details in appendix A.1

**Figure A-7: The effect of expected political competition  
(events of social and political discontent)  
on the distance of *ejidos* from municipal headquarters over time**



Notes: Estimates, and 95 and 99 percent confidence intervals, of the regression of the distance of the allocated *ejidos* from their municipal headquarters on municipality fixed effects, quinquennium fixed effects, and the interaction of the standardized events of social and political discontent events from 1960-1969 and the full set of quinquennium dummies. The omitted quinquennium is 1960 and represented by the coefficient without confidence intervals.

**Table A-1: OLS estimates: Clientelism and incumbency status**

Dependent variable is:	The party gives or promises [...] to citizens as inducement to obtain their votes.					
	Consumer Goods	Public Social Policy Schemes	Preferential Access to Public Sector Employment	Preferential Access to Government Contracts	Influence Regulatory Rules	Clientelism Index
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Mean dependent variable:	57.34	64.30	60.94	60.69	60.31	60.60
Incumbent Party	8.9141*** (1.7343)	10.8692*** (1.5545)	10.2314*** (1.5382)	13.0603*** (1.8733)	10.8299*** (1.4407)	10.9964*** (1.5571)
Controlling for ideology (left-right)	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	505	505	505	505	505	505
R-squared	0.7963	0.6740	0.7787	0.7459	0.7248	0.7477

*Notes:* Observations at the political party level. The sample includes 505 parties across 88 countries observed in 2009 by the Democratic Accountability and Linkages Project. Data includes all democratic polities of at least two million inhabitants with a minimum recent experience of two rounds of national electoral competition under at least semidemocratic conditions. The latter were identified in terms of average civil and political rights scores of at least 4.0, as awarded by the annual Freedom House survey. Beyond this set of countries, a few prominent countries with multi-party electoral politics were included (Egypt, Indonesia, Malaysia, Pakistan, Russia). Dependent variables come from the average results of expert surveys within the country evaluating the statement: "Consider whether candidates and parties give or promise to citizens [...] as inducement to obtain their votes. How much effort do this party expend to attract voters providing or promising [...]." Where [...] corresponds to any of the options specified in the columns 1 to 5. All dependent variables range from 0 to 100 where 100 represent a major effort. Incumbent is a dummy equal to one if the party received the maximum average vote share in the country in the last two legislative elections. Clientelism Index is the average of the responses used in columns 1 to 5. Clustered errors at the country level in parenthesis.\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

**Table A-2: Classification of opposition parties**

<b>Party abbreviation</b>	<b>Name details and coalitions</b>	<b>Opposition classification</b>
PST	Partido Socialista de los Trabajadores	Friendly
PRT	Partido Revolucionario de los Trabajadores	Unfriendly
PRDPRT	PRD + PRT	Unfriendly
PRDPSPFCRN	PRD + PPS + PFCRN (Frente Cardenista de Reconstruccion Nacional)	Unfriendly
PRDPMT	PRD + PMT	Unfriendly
PRD	Partido de la Revolucion Democratica	Unfriendly
PPS	Partido Popular Socialista	Friendly
PPM	Partido del Pueblo Mexicano	Unfriendly
PMT	Partido Mexicano de los Trabajadores	Unfriendly
PFCRNPMSPPS	PFCRN + PMS + PPS	Friendly
PDM	Partido Democrata Mexicano	Unfriendly
PCM	Partido Comunista Mexicano	Unfriendly
PCDP	Partido del comite de Defensa Popular	Unfriendly
PC	Previous PCM	Unfriendly
PARM	Partido Autentico de la Revolucion Mexicana	Friendly
PAN	Partido de Accion Nacional	Unfriendly
Other	Votes for other parties not specified in electoral database	Unfriendly

Notes: The parties listed are the full set of PRI opposition parties registered in the BANAMEX-CIDAC electoral database for municipal races in our sample period for computing electoral competition (1980s). A party is classified as friendly if it is listed as 'parastatal' in (Molinar & Weldon, 1990) and (Peiro, 1998).

**Table A-3: Summary statistics**

	Mean	Standard deviation	N
<b>A. Public goods</b>			
<b>a. Census of Schools in 2011</b>			
<i>Number of public schools per capita within 5km of the locality</i>			
- Active and established before 1990	0.729	2.331	199,391
- Active and established before 2000	0.958	3.279	199,391
<b>b. Census in 2000</b>			
<i>Share of households in locality with...</i>			
- Piped water	0.455	0.407	107,218
- Drainage	0.282	0.322	107,218
- Electricity	0.674	0.391	107,218
<b>c. Census in 1990</b>			
<i>Share of households in locality with...</i>			
- Piped water	0.316	0.375	97,484
- Drainage	0.131	0.229	97,484
- Electricity	0.423	0.422	97,484
<b>B. Bureaucratic state capacity</b>			
<i>Varying by locality:</i>			
-Distance of locality to municipal headquarters (km)	19.152	21.604	199,391
-Distance of locality from municipal headquarters accounting for terrain elevation profile (km)	19.219	22.023	199,391
-Distance of locality from municipal headquarters (km) via DCW roads	21.582	23.406	199,391
<i>Varying by ejido:</i>			
-Distance of <i>ejido</i> from municipal headquarters (km)	18.848	21.335	17,239
-Distance of <i>ejido</i> from municipal headquarters accounting for terrain elevation profile (km)	18.894	21.257	17,239
-Distance of <i>ejido</i> from municipal headquarters via DCW roads (km)	21.262	22.239	17,239
<b>C. Municipal political competition</b>			
<i>Average of 1980s elections:</i>			
-Opposition vote share	0.159	0.140	2,023
- Vote share friendly opposition	0.026	0.060	2,023
- Vote share unfriendly opposition	0.133	0.131	2,023
<i>Discontent 1960-1969:</i>			
Events of social and political discontent			
- Log (1+ number of events of social and political discontent )	0.386	0.762	2,440
<b>D. Instrument for political competition and events of social and political discontent</b>			
Months with droughts 1950-1959	58.535	25.628	2,440

Notes: Opposition vote share = 1 – PRI vote share. The number of events reflecting social and political discontent are counted during the period 1960-1969 using references to events in two Mexican newspapers with national coverage, *El Universal* and *Excelsior*. Further details in appendix A.1.

**Table A-4: Additional summary statistics**

	Mean	Standard deviation	Observations
<b>A. Municipal geographical covariates</b>			
Population Density 1900 (people/Km2)	24.051	39.437	2,290
Average monthly rainfall (mm)	90.62	51.987	2,437
Rain variability (Standard deviation of monthly rainfall)	78.051	40.352	2,437
Average soil humidity (Days)	197.406	83.098	2,456
Soil humidity variability (Standard deviation of soil humidity)	34.231	30.248	2,456
Average altitude (m)	1,438.143	876.307	2,456
Ruggedness (Standard deviation of altitude)	255.643	189.214	2,456
<b>B. Ejido land quality</b>			
Agricultural constraints (FAO)	0.181	0.377	22,819
Inherent land quality index (U.S. Department of Agriculture)	4.706	2.586	22,943
<b>C. Variables for robustness checks</b>			
<i>Varying by municipality and year:</i>			
-Number of allocated <i>ejidos</i>	0.141	0.791	164,715
-Stock of allocated <i>ejidos</i>	6.109	10.642	164,715
-Number of beneficiaries of <i>ejidos</i>	13.468	88.401	164,715
-Area granted in <i>ejidos</i> per beneficiary (Ha/people)	2.994	34.085	164,715
-Land Available in Distance Quantile 1 (As fraction of total area in distance quantile 1)	0.828	0.256	179,740
-Land Available in Distance Quantile 2 (As fraction of total area in distance quantile 2)	0.792	0.289	179,740
-Land Available in Distance Quantile 3 (As fraction of total area in distance quantile 3)	0.803	0.272	179,740
-Land Available in Distance Quantile 4 (As fraction of total area in distance quantile 4)	0.782	0.304	179,740
-Stock of land granted in form of <i>ejidos</i> at Distance Quantile 1 (As fraction of total area in distance quantile 1)	0.154	0.228	179,740
-Stock of land granted in form of <i>ejidos</i> at Distance Quantile 2 (As fraction of total area in distance quantile 2)	0.163	0.23	179,740
-Stock of land granted in form of <i>ejidos</i> at Distance Quantile 3 (As fraction of total area in distance quantile 3)	0.167	0.232	179,740
-Stock of land granted in form of <i>ejidos</i> at Distance Quantile 4 (As fraction of total area in distance quantile 4)	0.159	0.233	179,740
<i>Varying by municipality:</i>			
- Number of <i>ranchos</i> and <i>haciendas</i>	47.033	90.628	2,455
- Social capital in 1994 (Principal component)	0	1.445	2,455
- Population density in 1960 (people/km2)	64.573	345.753	2,389
- Population in the municipal headquarters in 1960 (people)	5,723.717	24,873.226	2,371
- Municipal Bureaucrats 1940	0.747	10.259	2,386
- Federal and State Bureaucrats 1940	216.413	10,396.091	2,386
- Land Available at Distance Quantile 1 in 1959 (As fraction of total area in distance quantile 1)	0.798	0.264	2,365
- Land Available at Distance Quantile 2 in 1959 (As fraction of total area in distance quantile 2)	0.757	0.292	2,365
- Land Available at Distance Quantile 3 in 1959 (As fraction of total area in distance quantile 3)	0.77	0.275	2,365
- Land Available at Distance Quantile 4 in 1959 (As fraction of total area in distance quantile 4)	0.753	0.306	2,365
- Stock of land granted in form of <i>ejidos</i> at Distance Quantile 1 in 1959 (As fraction of total area in distance quantile 1)	0.181	0.234	2,365
- Stock of land granted in form of <i>ejidos</i> at Distance Quantile 2 in 1959 (As fraction of total area in distance quantile 2)	0.195	0.235	2,365
- Stock of land granted in form of <i>ejidos</i> at Distance Quantile 3 in 1959 (As fraction of total area in distance quantile 3)	0.198	0.236	2,365
- Stock of land granted in form of <i>ejidos</i> at Distance Quantile 4 in 1959 (As fraction of total area in distance quantile 4)	0.186	0.238	2,365

Notes: Agricultural constraints is an indicator that the land presents few constraints for agriculture. The inherent land quality index varies from 1 (low quality) to 9 (high quality). Social capital in 1994 is the first principal component of the number of human rights organizations, popular fronts and peasants. The land available is calculated as the potential agricultural land in 2007 minus the stock of allocated *ejidos* by year. Further details on the construction of land available by distance quartiles are in Appendix Figure A-4. The number of events reflecting social and political discontent are counted during the period 1960-1969 using references to related events in two Mexican newspapers with national coverage: *El Universal* and *Excelsior*, further details in appendix A.1.



**Table A-5: Most common words identifying events of social and political discontent**

Freq	Word	Freq	Word	Freq	Word	Freq	Word
770	huelga	139	aumento	99	miembros	82	intervencion
626	campesinos	136	policia	99	problema	82	servicio
511	trabajadores	131	agua	99	grupos	82	lider
368	estudiantes	129	escuela	98	habitantes	81	republica
368	tierras	128	zona	98	comision	81	secretario
318	gobierno	127	comercio	97	movimiento	80	palacio
308	gobernador	125	piden	96	situacion	80	guerrero
304	sindicato	124	terrenos	95	municipios	80	capital
279	ciudad	118	personas	95	manifestacion	79	representantes
274	presidente	118	apoyo	95	ejidales	77	mil
261	ejidatarios	117	federal	94	departamento	75	funcionarios
254	nacional	115	obreros	94	agrarias	75	federales
254	municipal	110	mexico	93	local	75	propietarios
253	grupo	109	poblacion	92	comerciantes	75	colectivo
252	autoridades	108	municipio	92	problemas	74	alcalde
245	denuncian	107	compania	90	pagos	74	puebla
231	maestros	106	pobladores	89	exigen	74	ley
220	protesta	106	ejercito	89	denuncia	73	descontento
190	universidad	105	falta	88	lideres	73	agrarios
173	empresa	105	comunidades	88	dias	73	pais
172	conflicto	103	mitin	87	despojo	72	ayuntamiento
149	paro	102	san	86	federacion	71	revision
146	union	101	entidad	86	municipales	71	acuerdo
145	general	100	frente	83	ejidal	71	alumnos
141	contrato	99	industria	82	estudiantil	70	region

Notes: Frequency of most common words across news headlines after filtering most common words in spanish.

**Table A-6: *Ejido* distance from municipal headquarters and public goods provision**

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Dependent variable:	Share of households in locality with... Piped water	Drainage	Electricity	Number of Schools per capita
<i>Panel A: Localities in 1990</i>				
Distance of <i>ejido</i> locality from municipal headquarters	-0.0017*** (0.0003)	-0.0010*** (0.0002)	-0.0033*** (0.0005)	-0.0022*** (0.0004)
Observations	31,958	31,958	31,958	31,958
R-squared	0.3152	0.2769	0.3903	0.1022
<i>Panel B: Localities in 2000</i>				
Distance of <i>ejido</i> locality from municipal headquarters	-0.0011*** (0.0003)	-0.0018*** (0.0004)	-0.0023*** (0.0004)	-0.0028*** (0.0006)
Observations	41,005	41,005	41,005	41,005
R-squared	0.3118	0.4255	0.3713	0.2113

Notes: Cross-section of localities that overlap with ejidos. All specifications include municipality fixed effects. Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the municipality level. Distance of *ejido* from municipal headquarters refers to the population-weighted minimum Euclidean distance of the *ejido* localities from the municipal headquarters (See Appendix Figure A-3 for details). The number of public schools in 2000 and 1990 is the number of active public schools funded before 2000 and 1990, respectively. It is computed within a 5km radius around the locality. Population comes from the 2000 and 1990 census of localities., \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1.

Table A-7: Predetermined Covariate Balance

Dependent variable:	Population Density in 1900	Average monthly rainfall	Rain variability	Average soil humidity	Soil humidity variability	Average altitude	Ruggedness (altitude variability)	Agricultural Constraints	Inherent land Quality index	Municipal Bureaucrats 1940	Federal and State Bureaucrats 1940
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)		
Opposition Vote Share	5.146*** (1.223)	-3.195** (1.451)	-2.817** (1.303)	-0.977 (3.203)	-1.367** (0.502)	-19.846 (25.489)	-20.316*** (5.483)	0.012 (0.014)	0.147 (0.105)	0.135*** (0.035)	1.272*** (0.185)
Observations	1,566	1,676	1,676	1,679	1,679	1,679	1,679	1,675	1,677	1,644	1,644
R-squared	0.282	0.590	0.524	0.090	0.031	0.534	0.236	0.446	0.294	0.219	0.130
Events of Social and Political Discontent	5.665*** (1.645)	-0.589 (0.807)	-0.626 (0.858)	-1.116 (2.514)	-0.501 (1.067)	-10.287 (24.435)	6.382 (5.903)	0.009 (0.014)	0.029 (0.046)	0.246*** (0.030)	2.664*** (0.219)
Observations	1,566	1,676	1,676	1,676	1,676	1,676	1,676	1,672	1,674	1,643	1,643
R-squared	0.289	0.586	0.519	0.088	0.030	0.533	0.228	0.445	0.292	0.268	0.206
Months with Droughts 1950-1959	1.176 (1.059)	-15.841*** (5.503)	-7.516 (5.135)	-9.168*** (2.848)	-1.147 (0.890)	-93.392** (42.299)	-31.374** (12.929)	0.072** (0.035)	0.094 (0.219)	0.012 (0.025)	0.678** (0.307)
Observations	1,566	1,676	1,676	1,679	1,679	1,679	1,679	1,675	1,677	1,644	1,644
R-squared	0.262	0.632	0.535	0.096	0.030	0.539	0.241	0.465	0.292	0.200	0.113
State Fixed Effects	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

Notes: All variables in rows are standardized. Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the state level, \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1. Regressions are at the municipality level, with the dependent variable as indicated in each column title. The sample of municipalities is the one entering in the baseline regression. see the notes to Appendix Table A-3 and the main text for exact definitions. The measure of droughts refers to the number of months from 1950 to 1959 in which the monthly rainfall was strictly lower than the long-run average of each particular month, and therefore accounting for seasonality and non-expected periods of low rainfall. The number of events reflecting social and political discontent are counted during the period 1960-1969 using references to related events in two Mexican newspapers with national coverage: *El Universal* and *Excelsior*, further details in appendix A.1

**Table A-8: Distance from municipal headquarters and political competition:  
Controlling for trends based on predetermined variables**

Dependent variable: Distance of <i>ejido</i> from municipal headquarters		
	(1)	(2)
Competition measured as:	Opposition vote share	Events of Social and Political Discontent
Post 1960 × Competition	3.415*** (1.281)	1.985** (0.982)
Observations	15,848	16,085
R-squared	0.584	0.585
<i>Controls for all specifications:</i>		
Post 1960 × Covariates	✓	✓
Municipality Fixed Effects	✓	✓
Year of Allocation Fixed Effects	✓	✓

Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the municipality level, \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1. Regressions are at the *ejido* level. Competition refers to political competition measured at the municipality level using the variable indicated in each column (see the notes to Appendix Table A-3 and the main text for exact definitions). Distance of *ejido* from municipal headquarters refers to the population-weighted minimum Euclidean distance of the *ejido* localities from the municipal headquarters (See Appendix Figure A-3 for details). All competition measures are standardized. All regressions are controlling for geographic variables, climatic variables, and municipal bureaucratic capacity measures all interacted with a post-1960 indicator in Appendix Table A-7

**Table A-9: Test for weak instruments and weak-IV robust inference**

	(1)	(2)
Dependent variable: Distance of <i>ejido</i> from municipal headquarters		
Model Estimation	IV	IV
<i>Panel A: Estimates from the baseline specification</i>		
	Opposition vote share	Events of Social and Political Discontent
Post 1960 × Competition	7.077*** (2.710)	9.847** (4.716)
Observations	17,059	17,239
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F statistic	39.166	9.559
<i>Panel B: Test under the null hypothesis that instruments are weak</i>		
	Critical value (result)	
Stock-Yogo test (iid errors)		
$b = 25\%$	5.53 (Rejected)	5.53 (Rejected)
$b = 20\%$	6.66 (Rejected)	6.66 (Rejected)
$b = 15\%$	8.96 (Rejected)	8.96 (Rejected)
$b = 10\%$	16.38 (Rejected)	16.38 (Not rejected)
Montiel-Pflueger test (auto-correlated errors)		
$\tau = 30\%$	12.039 (Rejected)	12.039 (Not Rejected)
$\tau = 20\%$	15.062 (Rejected)	15.062 (Not Rejected)
$\tau = 10\%$	23.109 (Rejected)	23.109 (Not Rejected)
$\tau = 5\%$	37.418 (Rejected)	37.418 (Not Rejected)
<i>Panel C: Robust inference with potentially weak instruments</i>		
Null hypothesis ( $H_0$ ): Post 1960 × Competition = 0		
Anderson-Rubin Test		
Statistic chi2(1)	5.99	4.73
p-value (Prob > chi2)	0.0144	0.0296

Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the municipality level, \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*  $p < 0.1$ . Regressions are at the *ejido* level. Post-1960 is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the *ejido* is granted after 1960. Competition refers to political competition measured at the municipality level using the variable indicated in each column (see the notes to Appendix Table A-3 and the main text for exact definitions). The instrument used is months with droughts, measured as the number of months from 1950 to 1959 in which the monthly rainfall was strictly lower than the long-run average of each particular month, and therefore accounting for seasonality and non-expected periods of low rainfall. Distance of *ejido* from municipal headquarters refers to the population-weighted minimum Euclidean distance of the *ejido* localities from the municipal headquarters (See Appendix Figure A-3 for details). All competition measures are standardized.

Panel B tests if instruments are weak, assuming independent and identically distributed (Stock-Yogo) or auto-correlated (Montiel-Pflueger) errors. In each case, we reject the null hypothesis of weak instruments if the Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F statistic exceeds the critical value (for a significance level of 5%). In the Stock-Yogo test, the critical value depends on a lower threshold  $b$  for the bias of the IV estimator relative to OLS's bias. In the Montiel-Pflueger test, the critical value depends on whether the asymptotic estimator bias (or Nagar bias) exceeds a fraction  $\tau$  of a "worst-case" benchmark. We report critical values for conventional thresholds (implemented with the `ivreg2` and `weakivtest` commands in Stata, respectively) for thresholds  $b = 10\%, 15\%, 20\%, 25\%$  and  $\tau = 5\%, 10\%, 20\%, 30\%$ .

Panel C implements a minimum distance approach for robust hypothesis testing in the presence of potentially weak instruments on the main coefficients reported in Panel A (implemented with the `rivtest` command in Stata).

**Table A-10: Distance from municipal headquarters and opposition vote share: Distinguishing friendly and unfriendly opposition**

Dependent variable: Distance of <i>ejido</i> from municipal headquarters				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Post-1960 × Vote share opposition	3.243** (1.308)			
Post-1960 × Vote share friendly opposition		1.167** (0.525)		1.419*** (0.505)
Post-1960 × Vote share unfriendly opposition			2.919** (1.401)	3.039** (1.403)
Municipality Fixed Effects	✓	✓	✓	✓
Year of Allocation Fixed Effects	✓	✓	✓	✓
Observations	17,059	17,059	17,059	17,059
R-squared	0.579	0.576	0.578	0.579

*Test of inequality of coefficients in Column 4*

$$H_0: \beta_{\text{Post-1960} \times \text{Vote share unfriendly}} \leq \beta_{\text{Post-1960} \times \text{Vote share friendly}} \quad \text{p-value}$$

$$H_a: \beta_{\text{Post-1960} \times \text{Vote share unfriendly}} > \beta_{\text{Post-1960} \times \text{Vote share friendly}} \quad 0.130$$

Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the municipality level, \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1. Regressions are at the *ejido* level. All specifications include municipality and presidential-term fixed effects. Post-1960 is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the *ejido* is granted after 1960. All vote shares are standardized. For the classification of friendly opposition, see Section 4.1 and Appendix Table A-2.

**Table A-11: Distance from municipal headquarters and political competition: Accounting for the strength of rural elites and state-specific trends**

Dependent variable: Distance of <i>ejido</i> from municipal headquarters				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Competition measured as:	Opposition vote share		Events of Social and Political Discontent	
Econometric Specification:	OLS	IV	OLS	IV
<i>Panel A: Strength of rural elites</i>				
Post-1960 × Competition	3.240** (1.276)	7.124*** (2.678)	2.291** (1.032)	9.921** (4.728)
Post-1960 × Number of <i>ranchos</i> and <i>haciendas</i>	-0.0193*** (0.00535)	-0.0193*** (0.00581)	-0.0178*** (0.00501)	-0.0137*** (0.00527)
Observations	17,059	17,059	17,239	17,239
R-squared	0.580		0.582	
First Stage R-Squared		0.621		0.518
First Stage F statistic (Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald)		38.98		9.681
<i>Panel B: State-specific trends</i>				
Post-1960 × Competition	2.750*** (0.662)	8.471*** (1.964)	1.109* (0.655)	8.676*** (3.243)
Observations	17,059	17,059	17,239	17,239
R-Squared		0.715		0.590
First Stage R-Squared		0.715		0.591
First Stage F statistic (Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald)		15.21		5.005
Quadratic state trends	✓	✓	✓	✓
Post-1960 × State indicator	✓	✓	✓	✓
<i>Controls for all specifications:</i>				
Municipality Fixed Effects	✓	✓	✓	✓
Year of Allocation Fixed Effects	✓	✓	✓	✓

Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the municipality level, \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1. Regressions are at the *ejido* level. Post-1960 is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the *ejido* is granted after 1960. Panel A includes quadratic time trends interacted with state dummies and the interaction of each state dummy with the Post-1960 dummy. In Panel B, the number of *ranchos* and *haciendas* is the number of large landholdings, also measured at the municipality level. Competition refers to political competition measured at the municipality level using the variable indicated in each column. see the notes to Appendix Table A-3 and the main text for exact definitions. All competition measures are standardized. The IV columns instrument competition measures with the number of months with droughts during the 50s. The measure of droughts refers to the number of months from 1950 to 1959 in which the monthly rainfall was strictly lower than the long-run average of each particular month, and therefore accounting for seasonality and non-expected periods of low rainfall. The number of events reflecting social and political discontent are counted during the period 1960-1969 using references to related events in two Mexican newspapers with national coverage: *El Universal* and *Excelsior*, further details in appendix A.1

**Table A-12: Distance to municipal headquarters and political competition:  
Results for different distance measures**

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
Baseline results, <i>ejidos</i> allocated from 1914 to 1992, Dependent variable: Distance of <i>ejido</i> from municipality head									
Type of minimum distance:	Euclidean			Accounting for Terrain Elevation			Trough DCW Roads		
Econometric Specification	OLS	IV	RF	OLS	IV	RF	OLS	IV	RF
<i>Panel A: Competition measured as the Vote Share of Opposition Parties</i>									
Post 1960 × Competition	3.243** (1.308)	7.077*** (2.717)		3.366** (1.425)	7.038** (2.913)		3.428** (1.454)	7.122** (3.043)	
Post 1960 × Months with Droughts 1950-1959			2.43** (0.99)			2.41** (1.07)			2.44** (1.12)
R-Squared		0.621			0.621			0.621	
Observations	17,059	17,059	17,059	17,059	17,059	17,059	17,059	17,059	17,059
First Stage R-Squared		0.621			0.621			0.621	
First Stage F statistic (Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald)		38.99			38.99			38.99	
<i>Panel B: Competition measured as the number of Events of Social and Political Discontent 1960-1969</i>									
Post 1960 × Competition	2.391** (1.056)	9.847** (4.728)		2.540** (1.128)	9.719* (4.975)		2.574** (1.161)	9.741* (5.106)	
Post 1960 × Months with Droughts 1950-1959			2.08** (0.96)			2.06** (1.03)			2.06* (1.08)
R-squared	0.581			0.547			0.548		
Observations	17,239	17,239	17,239	17,239	17,239	17,239	17,239	17,239	17,239
First Stage R-Squared		0.517			0.517			0.517	
First Stage F statistic (Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald)		9.518			9.518			9.518	
<i>Controls for all specifications:</i>									
Municipality Fixed Effects	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Year of Allocation Fixed Effects	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the municipality level, \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1. Regressions are at the *ejido* level. Competition refers to political competition measured at the municipality level using the variable indicated in each panel (see the notes to Appendix Table A-3 and the main text for exact definitions). All competition measures are standardized. The measure of droughts refers to the number of months from 1950 to 1959 in which the monthly rainfall was strictly lower than the long-run average of each particular month, and therefore accounting for seasonality and non-expected periods of low rainfall. The number of events reflecting social and political discontent are counted during the period 1960-1969 using references to related events in two Mexican newspapers with national coverage: *El Universal* and *Excelsior*, further details in appendix A.1 Distance of *ejido* from municipal headquarters in panel A refers to the population-weighted minimum Euclidean distance of the *ejido* localities from the municipal headquarters (See Appendix Figure A-3 for details). The distance of *ejido* from municipal headquarters in columns 4,5 and 6 accounts for terrain by penalizing the minimum Euclidean distance in columns 1,2 and 3 when there are changes in altitude in the straight path that connects the localities within the *ejido* and their municipal headquarters (See Appendix Figure A-3 for details). The distance from the municipal headquarters via DCW roads in columns 7,8 and 9 accounts for the use of roads to reach the municipal headquarters. The trace of those roads comes from the Digital Chart of the World of 1992 and the overall distance of each locality from its municipal headquarters is computed adding up two different figures. First, the Euclidean distance from the locality to the closest point in a road that leads to the municipality head, and second, the length of the segment that connects such point to the municipal headquarters following the road path (See Appendix Figure A-3 for details).



**Table A-13: Land quality and political competition:  
Is it about appeasing the opposition?**

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Competition measured as:	Opposition vote share		Events of Social and Political Discontent	
Econometric Specification:	OLS	IV	OLS	IV
<i>Panel A: Dependent variable: Agricultural constraints (FAO)</i>				
Post-1960 × Competition	0.001 (0.005)	-0.038 (0.024)	0.002 (0.005)	-0.054 (0.038)
Observations	15,855	15,855	15,855	15,855
R-Squared		0.616		0.663
Partial F		37.13		8.424
<i>Panel B: Dependent variable: Land quality index (U.S/ Department of Agriculture)</i>				
Post-1960 × Competition	0.029 (0.050)	0.070 (0.138)	0.003 (0.036)	0.098 (0.196)
Observations	15,922	15,922	15,922	15,922
R-Squared		0.618		0.665
Partial F		36.72		8.926
<i>Controls for all specifications:</i>				
Municipality Fixed Effects	✓	✓	✓	✓
Year of Allocation Fixed Effects	✓	✓	✓	✓

Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the municipality level, \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1. Regressions are at the *ejido* level. Post-1960 is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the *ejido* is granted after 1960, which is included in addition to the reported interaction term. Competition refers to political competition measured at the municipality level using the variable indicated in each column. The dependent variable is the land quality of each allocated *ejido* as measured using each of the variables in each panel title. Panel A outcome was constructed using a seven-category measure of agricultural constraints from the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), which captures how easy it is to grow crops on that land. Panel B outcome is a nine-level index of inherent land quality from the US Department of Agriculture (transformed so that higher values indicate higher land quality). The regressions also control for the interaction of Post-1960 with the host of population, geographic and climatic municipal controls in Table A-7. See the notes for Appendix Table A-3 and the main text for exact definitions. All competition measures are standardized. The number of observations changes relative to those in baseline regressions as some covariates are not available for all *ejidos*. The IV columns instrument competition measures with the number of months with droughts during the 50s. The measure of droughts refers to the number of months from 1950 to 1959 in which the monthly rainfall was strictly lower than the long-run average of each particular month, and therefore accounting for seasonality and non-expected periods of low rainfall. The number of events reflecting social and political discontent are counted during the period 1960-1969 using references to related events in two Mexican newspapers with national coverage: *El Universal* and *Excelsior*, further details in appendix A.1

**Table A-14: Distance from municipal headquarters and political competition:  
Is it about isolating insurgents and potential opposition?**

Dependent variable: Distance of <i>ejido</i> from municipal headquarters			
	(1)	(2)	(3)
	Competition measured as		
	Opposition vote share	Events of Social and Political Discontent	Reduced Form
<i>Panel A: Social capital in 1994</i>			
Post 1960 × Competition	3.54** (1.54)	3.03** (1.50)	2.41** (1.03)
Post 1960 × Social capital in 1994	-0.02 (0.86)	0.57 (0.95)	0.17 (0.47)
Post 1960 × Competition × Social capital in 1994	-0.27 (0.48)	-0.54 (0.38)	-0.15 (0.52)
Observations	17,059	17,239	17,298
R-squared	0.58	0.58	0.58
<i>Panel B: Population density in 1960</i>			
Post 1960 × Competition	3.54*** (1.16)	3.01*** (1.03)	1.48** (0.64)
Post 1960 × Population density in 1960	-0.08*** (0.01)	-0.08*** (0.02)	-0.08*** (0.02)
Post 1960 × Competition × Population density in 1960	-0.02 (0.02)	-0.02 (0.02)	-0.05* (0.03)
Observations	17,059	17,239	17,298
R-squared	0.58	0.58	0.58
<i>Panel C: Population in the municipal headquarters in 1960</i>			
Post 1960 × Competition	2.40** (1.10)	1.96* (1.00)	1.99** (0.96)
Post 1960 × Population in the municipality head in 1960	0.70 (0.43)	0.84* (0.44)	1.19*** (0.43)
Post 1960 × Competition × Population in the municipality head in 1960	0.42 (0.54)	-0.25 (0.34)	0.18 (0.35)
Observations	17,059	17,239	17,298
R-squared	0.58	0.58	0.58
<i>Controls for all specifications:</i>			
Municipality Fixed Effects	✓	✓	✓
Year of Allocation Fixed Effects	✓	✓	✓

Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the municipality level, \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1. Regressions are at the *ejido* level. All specifications include municipality and presidential-term fixed effects. Post-1960 is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the *ejido* is granted after 1960. Panel A analyzes heterogeneity by social capital, which is calculated as the first principal component (explaining 70% of the variance in the data) of the municipality's number of human rights organizations, popular fronts, and peasant organizations in 1994. Panel B considers heterogeneity by the municipality's population density in 1960. Panel C explores heterogeneity by the population of the municipal headquarters in 1960. Competition refers to political competition measured at the municipality level using the variable indicated in each column. We demean the measures of competition, social capital, population density and population in the municipal headquarters in 1960 so that the double interactions can be interpreted as the corresponding effects at the mean. All competition measures are standardized. Column 3 present the result of using the measure of droughts instead of the variables of competition. The measure of droughts refers to the number of months from 1950 to 1959 in which the monthly rainfall was strictly lower than the long-run average of each particular month, and therefore accounting for seasonality and non-expected periods of low rainfall.