B Online appendix (Not for publication)

B.1 Variable definition and sources

Table B-1: Variable definition and sources

Variable	Description
Age	Respondent's age in years.
Agree with bribery	Equals 1 if respondent "totally agrees" or "agrees" with the statement: "As things are, sometimes paying a bribe is justified."
Authorities violate the law	Equals 1 if respondent "totally agrees" or "agrees" with the statement: "To capture criminals, authorities should sometimes violate the law."
Catholic	Equals 1 for Catholics (self-declared).
Commerce sector	Equals 1 if commerce is one of three sectors generating more formal employment in the municipality (2012). *Source*: Ministry of Health and Social Protection.
Contributes to social security	Equals 1 if respondent pays contributions to the social security system (thus excluding members of the subsidized social security system).
Dark	Respondent's skin color based on color palette (assessed by interviewer). The palette is numbered from 1 to 11 (1 = lightest color). *Dark* Equals 1 for colors greater than or equal to 5.
Education	Educational attainment. Equals 1 if respondent has some secondary education or more.
Employed household head	Equals 1 if household head was employed in the week preceding the survey.
Employment	Equal 1 if respondent was employed the week preceding the survey.
Employment firms 2+	Total formal employment in firms with two or more employees as a proportion of total formal employment (2012). *Source*: Ministry of Health and Social Protection.
Evangelical/Pentecostal	Equals 1 for Evangelical/Pentecostal (self-declared).
FEA	Equals 1 if household is a *Familias en acción* (main conditional cash transfer for the poor with school-age children) beneficiary.
Formal credit	Equals 1 if household has any formal credit.
Fractionalization	$F_j = 1 - \sum_{i=1}^{N} \pi_{ij}^2$, where π_{ij} is the vote share for the mayoral candidate (in 2011) i in municipality j. See Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005). *Pachón and Sánchez (2014)*.
Frequency of voting	Equals 1 if respondent "Always votes in elections" or "Votes in most elections," 0 otherwise ("Rarely votes in elections" or "Never voted").
Get help	Equals 1 if household answers "yes" to at least one of the following questions: "During the past 12 months, do any members of the household receive money or in-kind aid..." a."...from relatives or friends living in Colombia?", b."from relatives or friends living abroad?" c."for alimony?", d."from international organizations (WFP, UNICEF, ICRC)?", e. "from NGOs?", f. "from the church or other religious organizations?", g. "from other persons, entities or organizations?"
Gov. against inequality	Equals 1 if respondent "totally agrees" or "agrees" with the statement: "The government should implement strong policies to reduce inequality between rich and poor."
Government role	Equals 1 if respondent "totally agrees" or "agrees" with the statement: "Government is primarily responsible for ensuring the welfare of the people."

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Table B-1 – Variable definition and sources, continued from previous page

Variable	Description
Guerrillas	Number of violent events per year perpetrated by guerrillas per 100,000 inhabitants (average 2010–2012). *Sources*: Conflict analysis resource center (CERAC); Universidad del Rosario.
HH expenses	Per capita household expenses (Colombian pesos). See Bernal et al. (2014).
HH food expenses	Household funds spent on food (Colombian pesos). See Bernal et al. (2014).
Homeowner	Equals 1 if the household residence is "own, fully paid" or "own, being paid," Equals 0 otherwise ("rented" or "in usufruct or other type of tenure").
Homicide rate	Homicide rate per 100,000 inhabitants (average 2010–2012). *Source*: Medicina Legal.
Household with spouse	Equals 1 if household is inhabited by household head and spouse.
Independent	Equals 1 if working independently is the most important job during the previous month.
Justice into own hands	Equals 1 if respondent "totally agrees" or "agrees" with the statement: "When the government does not punish criminals, it is okay that people take justice into their own hands."
Land	Equals 1 if respondent reports owning land.
Male household head	Equals 1 if household head is male.
Neighbor cell phones	Equals 1 if person has the cell phone numbers of at least half of her neighbors.
Neighbor loans	Equals 1 if a person thinks that at least half of her neighbors would lend her money.
Negative reciprocity	Equals 1 if respondent "totally agrees" or "agrees" with the statement: "Whoever hurts me, pays for it."
No debts	Equals 1 if household has not any type of debt. Equals 0 otherwise ("debt without credit," "formal credit," "informal credit" or "formal-informal credit").
No sewage	Equals 1 if household dwelling has no sewage system.
Not in organization	Equals 1 if respondent does not belong to any organization (options included are *Juntas de acción comunal*, charity organization, community organization, religious organization, organizations supported or promoted by the state, ethnic organization, educational organization, labor union, cooperative of work or union of producers, organization of environment conservation, cultural or sports organization, other).
Nuclear family	Equals 1 ifhousehold is comprised of: household head and spouse, with or without children; or, household head without spouse but with children).
Other religion	Equals 1 for believers of religions other than Catholic, Evangelical, or Pentecostal (self-declared).
Overcrowded	Equals 1 if ratio of number of residents to number of bedrooms is greater than three in rural households, or greater than or equal to three in urban households.
Own welfare	Equals 1 if respondent "totally agrees" or "agrees" with the statement: "Each individual is responsible for their own welfare."
Paramilitaries	Number of violent events per year perpetrated by paramilitaries per 100,000 inhabitants (average 2010–2012). *Sources*: Conflict analysis resource center (CERAC); Universidad del Rosario.
People in household	Number of household residents.
Polarization	Reynal-Querol (2002) polarization index. $P_j = 1 - \sum_{i=1}^{N} \pi_{ij} \left(\frac{1/2 - \pi_{ij}}{1/2} \right)^2$, where π_{ij} is the vote share for the mayoral candidate (in 2011) i in municipality j. See Pachón and Sánchez (2014).
Pop. density	Population divided by total area (km^2) in the municipality.
Popular vote	Equals 1 if respondent "totally agrees" or "agrees" with the statement: "It is important that rulers are elected by popular vote."

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Table B-1 – Variable definition and sources, continued from previous page

Variable	Description
Positive reciprocity	Equals 1 if respondent "totally agrees" or "agrees" with the statement: "You always have to help those who help you."
Regions	Regions included in fixed effects. Urban regions in the survey are: *Atlántica*, *Oriental*, *Central*, *Pacífica*, *Bogotá*. Rural regions include: *Atlántica-Media*, *Cundi-Boyacense*, *Eje Cafetero*, *Centro-Oriente*.
Rural population	Proportion of rural population in the municipality (average 2006–2008). *Source*: DANE.
Savings	Equals 1 if respondent answers "yes" to: "Do you usually save some of the income you receive?"
Secret ballot	Equals 1 if respondent answers "yes" to: "Do you think that the ballot is secret?"
Send help	Equals 1 if household answers "yes" to at least one of the following questions: "During the past 12 months, did any members of the household send money or in-kind aid..." a."to relatives or friends who live in Colombia?", b."to relatives or friends who live abroad?", c."for alimony?" d. "to other persons, entities or organizations?".
Shock	Equals 1 if household reports any major destabilizing negative event during the previous three years.
Social program beneficiary	Equals 1 if household benefits from any of the following programs: *Familias en acción* (main conditional cash transfer for the poor with school-age children), programs for the elderly, *SENA* training programs, *Red Juntos - Unidos* (program that provides social services to displaced families with the lowest levels of poverty), *ICBF* programs for children, aid for displaced people, support to households affected by natural disasters, or "other programs."
Social security	Equals 1 if respondent is affiliated to social security.
State presence	Raw total of local state agencies, local municipality employees, and national-level municipality employees (per capita in 1995). *Acemoglu, Garcia-Jimeno, and Robinson (2015)*.
Stratum 1, 2	Socio-economic stratum, based on classification of household residence (used to target utility subsidies).
Use of violence	Equals 1 if respondent "totally agrees" or "agrees" with the statement: "Sometimes the use of violence is justified."
Vote for the same party	Equals 1 if respondent "Always votes for the same party" or "Almost always votes for the same party." Equals 0 otherwise ("Votes for different parties" or "Always votes blank").
Wealth	First principal component following a *principal component analysis* on a set of reported household assets and dwelling characteristics. See Bernal et al. (2014).
Win margin	Difference between the vote shares of the winner and runner-up in the 2011 mayoral election. See Pachón and Sánchez (2014).
Woman	Equals 1 if respondent is female.
Workers per firm	Average number of formal workers per firms by municipality (2012). *Source*: Ministry of Health and Social Protection.

Notes: Source is Elca 2013 unless otherwise stated at the end of each description.

B.2 Balance between treatment and control groups in list experiments

We corroborate that respondents assigned to treatment and control lists, and the direct question, have similar observable characteristics. For a set of observables **X**, we check both the bivariate relationship between group assignment and observables:

$$\Pr(T_i = m) = f(x_i \beta_m) \quad \text{with } x_i \in \mathbf{x},$$

and the multivariate regression,

$$\Pr(T_i = m) = f(\mathbf{x}' \beta_m),$$

where m represents each group (*Treatment*, *Control 1*, and *Control 2*). We estimate the marginal effects of multinomial probit models.

Since randomization was stratified at the regional level, in both types of regressions we include region fixed effects. We also estimated separate regressions for each region, with similar results, but present only these aggregate results to save space. Similarly, we also estimated simple probit and linear probability models for dichotomous indicators of each treatment condition as the dependent variable, and again found no systematic evidence of imbalance.

Table B-2 shows balance using observables in 2010 and Table B-3 in 2013 for the tax evasion experiment.

Table B-2: Balance on covariates at baseline (2010): Tax evasion list experiment

	Urban sample						Rural sample					
	Bivariate			Multivariate			Bivariate			Multivariate		
Variables	*Treatment*	*Control 1*	*Control 2*	*Treatment*	*Control 1*	*Control 2*	*Treatment*	*Control 1*	*Control 2*	*Treatment*	*Control 1*	*Control 2*
Age	-0.001	0.001	-0.000	-0.001	0.001	-0.000	-0.001	0.000	0.001	-0.001*	0.001	0.001
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Male household head	-0.001	-0.000	0.001	0.008	-0.022	0.014	0.002	-0.023	0.022	-0.004	-0.006	0.009
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Education	0.001	-0.002	0.001	0.001	-0.000	-0.000	-0.001	-0.000	0.001	-0.001	-0.000	0.002
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Employed household head	0.005	0.003	-0.007	-0.002	0.011	-0.009	-0.007	0.018	-0.011	-0.015	0.027	-0.012
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Savings	-0.004	-0.010	0.014	-0.009	-0.007	0.016	-0.018	-0.010	0.028	-0.018	-0.009	0.027
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Not in organization	0.000	-0.000	-0.000	0.000	0.000	-0.000	0.001	-0.000	-0.000	0.001	-0.000	-0.000
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Social security	0.024	0.001	-0.026	0.030	-0.006	-0.024	-0.007	-0.001	0.008	0.004	-0.003	-0.002
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Contributes to social security	-0.006	-0.000	0.006	-0.015	0.011	0.004	-0.038	0.013	0.026	-0.031	0.016	0.015
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Household with spouse	0.006	-0.015	0.009	0.006	-0.021	0.015	0.000	0.028	-0.028	-0.004	0.026	-0.022
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Wealth	0.003	-0.003	-0.000	0.007	0.004	-0.011	-0.010	0.008	0.002	-0.008	0.014	-0.006
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
People in household	0.001	0.002	-0.004	0.003	-0.000	-0.003	0.003	-0.005	0.002	-0.001	-0.003	0.004
	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Overcrowded	0.001	-0.019	0.018	0.004	-0.019	0.016	-0.021	0.006	0.015	-0.013	-0.008	0.022
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Homeowner	-0.002	-0.004	0.007	0.005	-0.013	0.008	-0.005	-0.013	0.018	0.006	-0.016	0.010
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
No debts	-0.018	0.024*	-0.006	-0.020	0.030*	-0.011	-0.018	0.006	0.012	-0.011	0.017	-0.006
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Shock	0.011	0.011	-0.022	0.009	0.015	-0.025	-0.021	0.013	0.008	-0.023	0.011	0.012
	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
HH expenses (log)	-0.002	-0.004	0.007	0.005	-0.013	0.007	0.014	-0.020*	0.006	0.002	-0.014	0.012
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
HH food expenses	-0.010	0.003	0.008	-0.022	0.013	0.009	0.022*	-0.019	-0.003	0.030	-0.006	-0.024
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Nuclear family	-0.005	0.002	0.002	-0.002	-0.001	0.002	-0.002	-0.000	0.003	-0.006	-0.000	0.007
	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Formal credit	-0.008	0.011	-0.003	0.001	-0.005	0.003	-0.027	-0.005	0.032*	-0.027	-0.009	0.036*
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)
Get help	0.008	-0.004	-0.005	0.010	-0.007	-0.003	0.017	-0.016	-0.001	0.016	-0.010	-0.006
	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Send help	0.005	-0.013	0.009	0.002	-0.016	0.014	-0.045	0.029	0.017	-0.052*	0.030	0.022
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Social program beneficiary	0.016	0.008	-0.024	0.028	0.018	-0.046**	0.010	-0.005	-0.005	-0.004	0.020	-0.016
	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
FEA	0.008	0.004	-0.012	-0.012	-0.022	0.034	0.013	-0.014	0.001	0.011	-0.030	0.019
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Stratum 1	-0.016	0.011	0.005	-0.035	0.035	-0.000						
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)						
Stratum 2	-0.003	0.021	-0.018	-0.018	0.037*	-0.019						
	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)						
Wealth (rural): quintile 1							0.007	-0.013	0.006	0.007	-0.004	-0.002
							(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Wealth (rural): quintile 2							0.013	0.022	-0.035*	0.015	0.027	-0.042
							(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Wealth (rural): quintile 3							0.021	-0.037*	0.017	0.016	-0.017	0.001
							(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Wealth (rural): quintile 4							-0.017	0.021	-0.004	-0.010	0.024	-0.015
							(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
No sewage							0.006	-0.023	0.018	0.010	-0.026	0.015
							(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)

Notes: The table reports marginal effects from multinomial probit models, with standard errors in parentheses. All regressions include region fixed effects. *Treatment* refers to respondents who were presented with the list that included the sensitive item, *Control 1* received the list without the sensitive item followed by the direct question, and *Control 2* was asked the direct question. For variable definitions, see Appendix Table B-1. * is significant at the 10% level, ** is significant at the 5% level, *** is significant at the 1% level.

Table B-3: Balance on covariates at follow-up (2013): Tax evasion list experiment

	Urban sample						Rural sample					
	Bivariate			Multivariate			Bivariate			Multivariate		
Variables	*Treatment*	*Control 1*	*Control 2*	*Treatment*	*Control 1*	*Control 2*	*Treatment*	*Control 1*	*Control 2*	*Treatment*	*Control 1*	*Control 2*
Age	-0.000	0.001	-0.000	-0.000	0.001*	-0.001	-0.001	0.000	0.001	-0.001	0.000	0.001
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Male household head	-0.001	-0.007	0.008	-0.007	-0.012	0.020	-0.001	-0.011	0.012	0.004	0.005	-0.009
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Education	-0.000	0.000	0.000	-0.001	0.002	-0.001	0.001	-0.002	0.001	0.001	-0.003	0.002
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Employed household head	0.011	-0.018	0.007	0.012	-0.014	0.002	0.015	0.005	-0.020	0.004	0.014	-0.018
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Savings	0.004	-0.018	0.014	0.006	-0.015	0.008	0.029	0.019	-0.048***	0.029	0.017	-0.046***
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Not in organization	0.000	-0.020	0.020	-0.010	-0.017	0.027*	-0.011	-0.016	0.026*	-0.005	-0.020	0.025
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Social security	0.025	-0.038	0.013	0.034	-0.047*	0.013	0.046	-0.034	-0.012	0.042	-0.049	0.007
	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Contributes to social security	0.012	0.005	-0.016	0.031*	0.004	-0.035**	-0.024	0.006	0.018	-0.004	-0.015	0.019
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Household with spouse	-0.003	-0.007	0.010	-0.003	-0.021	0.024	0.010	0.023	-0.033*	0.004	0.045*	-0.049**
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Wealth	-0.005	0.002	0.003	-0.003	0.006	-0.003	-0.014*	0.011	0.003	-0.024	-0.014	0.038**
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
People in household	0.005	0.001	-0.006	0.007	-0.003	-0.005	-0.002	-0.002	0.004	-0.004	0.002	0.002
	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.01)
Overcrowded	-0.038**	0.004	0.034**	-0.035*	0.008	0.027	-0.003	0.039*	-0.036	0.000	0.039*	-0.039
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)
Homeowner	-0.007	-0.008	0.015	-0.005	-0.020	0.025*	0.016	-0.016	-0.000	0.026*	-0.023	-0.004
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
No debts	0.016	-0.002	-0.013	0.050	-0.068**	0.018	0.014	-0.011	-0.003	0.039	-0.014	-0.025
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Shock	-0.019	-0.001	0.020	-0.023	-0.002	0.025*	0.009	-0.007	-0.002	0.006	-0.006	-0.000
	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
HH expenses (log)	-0.010	-0.001	0.011	-0.016	-0.021	0.037	-0.010	-0.001	0.012	-0.011	-0.019	0.030
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
HH food expenses (log)	-0.010	0.012	-0.002	-0.011	0.029*	-0.018	-0.004	0.005	-0.001	0.010	0.022	-0.033
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Nuclear family	-0.009	0.010	-0.001	-0.005	0.001	0.004	-0.004	0.018	-0.013	-0.009	0.033*	-0.024
	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Formal credit	0.003	0.018	-0.021	-0.031	0.075***	-0.044*	0.001	-0.008	0.007	-0.028	0.003	0.025
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Get help	0.008	-0.025*	0.017	0.010	-0.028*	0.018	0.005	-0.031**	0.026*	0.005	-0.026*	0.022
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)
Send help	0.019	0.007	-0.026*	0.012	0.010	-0.023	-0.001	-0.008	0.009	-0.005	-0.001	0.006
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Social program beneficiary	-0.006	0.018	-0.012	0.004	0.005	-0.009	0.009	0.002	-0.011	-0.018	0.015	0.003
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
FEA	-0.013	0.026	-0.013	-0.034	0.031	0.003	0.022	-0.007	-0.015	0.032	-0.012	-0.020
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Stratum 1	0.002	0.006	-0.008	-0.018	0.035	-0.017						
	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)						
Stratum 2	-0.014	0.023*	-0.009	-0.030	0.043**	-0.014						
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)						
Wealth (rural): quintile 1							0.009	0.008	-0.017	-0.035	-0.090*	0.125**
							(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Wealth (rural): quintile 2							0.020	-0.025	0.005	-0.015	-0.102***	0.117***
							(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Wealth (rural): quintile 3							0.015	-0.038**	0.023	-0.011	-0.105***	0.115***
							(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Wealth (rural): quintile 4							-0.026	0.002	0.024	-0.032	-0.064**	0.096***
							(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
No sewage							0.002	0.004	-0.005	0.013	-0.003	-0.009
							(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)

Notes: The table reports marginal effects from multinomial probit models, with standard errors in parentheses. All regressions include region fixed effects. *Treatment* refers to respondents who were presented with the list that included the sensitive item, *Control 1* received the list without the sensitive item followed by the direct question, and *Control 2* was asked the direct question. For variable definitions, see Appendix Table B-1. * is significant at the 10% level, ** is significant at the 5% level, *** is significant at the 1% level.

B.3 Testing the 'no design' and 'no liar' assumptions in list experiments

In this Appendix we test for the 'no design' and 'no liar' assumptions in our list experiments, following Blair and Imai (2012). The test for the former compares the predicted average difference in answers to control items under treatment vs. control. With $Y_i(0)$, $Z^{\star}_{i,J+1}$, Y_i and T_i specified as above, let $\pi_{yz} = \Pr(Y_i(0), Z^{\star}_{i,J+1} = z)$ represent the proportion of the population in each type $(Y_i(0), Z^{\star}_{i,J+1})$. If there are no design effects, these proportions can be computed for all $y = 0, ..., J$ as follows:

$$\pi_{y1} = \Pr(Y_i <= y | T_i = 0) - \Pr(Y_i <= y | T_i = 1),$$
$$\pi_{y0} = \Pr(Y_i <= y | T_i = 1) - \Pr(Y_i <= y - 1 | T_i = 0).$$

Proportions π_{y1} and π_{y0} always take positive values. But with design effects, estimated proportions can be negative (for example, see Table 5 in Blair and Imai (2012)). To test for design effects, one can therefore evaluate whether the proportion of the population in each type (π_{yz}) is jointly non-negative.[44] Panel A in Table B-4 shows that no single estimated proportion is negative for either experiment, so the test suggests there is no evidence to reject the null hypothesis of no design effects.

To test the 'no liar' assumption, we can evaluate the two most common sources of untruthful answers: ceiling and floor effects. These occur when the respondent engages in either none or all of the behaviors, and thus feels exposed if he or she answers truthfully. In Table 1, the bulk of the answers in the treated lists (94.5%) are larger than zero and smaller than the maximum (five) number of items people can list. This reflects the fact that the original instrument design included option items that are likely to be negatively correlated with each other, as well as at least one very frequent behavior.

We also test for floor and ceiling effects more formally by estimating the model under the no liar assumption, and comparing it to an alternative model allowing for floor and ceiling effects. Based on different information criteria, if the data supports the second model, there is evidence to reject the null of no floor or ceiling effects.[45] Panel B of Table B-4 reports the results. Regardless of the criterion used, Schwarz's BIC or Akaike's AIC, the preferred model includes no floor or ceiling effects, so this test fails to reject the null of no floor or ceiling effects. Furthermore, these results hold either with covariates (Columns 1 and 2) or when the basic set of covariates in Table 2 is included.[46]

[44] This test, however, has limitations: there can be design effects with positive π_{y1} and π_{y0}. Also, a higher probability of positive answers to the sensitive item reduces the likelihood of rejecting the null of no design effects.

[45] Since the model is identified under the no floor or ceiling effects assumption, we must make additional assumptions to estimate the alternative, allowing for these effects. To do so, we follow Blair and Imai (2012) and consider that respondents' truthful answers to the sensitive item are independent of their answers for control items, conditional upon the pretreatment covariates.

[46] We also find similar results using a different set of covariates.

Table B-4: Testing assumptions in the list experiments

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Panel A: No design effects				
	Estimated proportions with response y to control items and...			
Response value (y)	...not following sensitive behavior ($\hat{\pi}_{y0}$)		...following sensitive behavior ($\hat{\pi}_{y1}$)	
	Estimate	*Std. Error*	*Estimate*	*Std. Error*
0	0.041	0.004	0.004	0.005
1	0.381	0.010	0.040	0.013
2	0.323	0.012	0.053	0.010
3	0.097	0.008	0.026	0.006
4	0.021	0.004	0.014	0.002
Total	0.863		0.137	
P-value	1			
Panel B: No liar effects				
	Information criterion			
	BIC	*AIC*	*BIC*	*AIC*
No boundary	9863.88	10050.28	9873.01	9885.44
Ceiling	9875.50	10173.80	9897.23	9894.14
Floor	9894.20	10176.84	9899.40	9915.55
Ceiling-Floor	9896.91	10300.36	9927.55	9924.26
Covariates	No	No	Yes	Yes

Notes: Panel A reports the estimated proportion of respondent types as described in each column title. The design effects test evaluates whether the population proportions are jointly non-negative. For each experiment, the Bonferroni-corrected *P-value* for the null of no design effects is reported. Panel B reports Schwarz's (BIC) and Akaike's (AIC) information criteria when the model is estimated without including boundaries (*No boundary*), including ceiling effects (*Ceiling*), including floor effects (*Floor*) and including both ceiling and floor effects (*Ceiling-Floor*). In this panel, the first two columns estimate the models without covariates, while the final two columns include the set of characteristics listed in Table 2.

B.4 Simple regression analysis

In the main text, we focus on the extreme bounds methodology to examine which variables are robustly correlated with tax evasion. This section reports a simpler regression analysis, which produces similar conclusions.

Table B-5 runs linear regressions for VAT evasion on the same set of variables explored in the text. Odd columns, labeled "bivariate," show the resulting coefficient for regressions including only one covariate at a time (in addition to region fixed effects, which are always included). Even columns show the coefficient for a multivariate regression, which simultaneously includes all variables listed in the table. The reported significant correlations (and their magnitudes) fall in line with those that survive the sensitivity analysis with the extreme bounds methodology reported in the main text. Finally, in the main text we also explored the role of a few interactions between correlates of interest. In Table B-6 we show the results of including such interaction terms in regressions that include only region fixed effects and the relevant lower-order uninteracted terms (in the even, "bivariate" columns) as well as in regressions containing the full set of covariates (Table B-5). Again, there are few differences from the results using the extreme bounds methodology.

Table B-5: Correlates of tax evasion: Simple regression analysis

	(1)	(2)		(3)	(4)
Variables	**Bivariate**	**Multivariate**	*Variables*	**Bivariate**	**Multivariate**
Wealth	-0.111***	-0.0752***	Evangelical/Pentecostal	-0.0155	-0.0424
	(0.0154)	(0.0231)		(0.0120)	(0.0270)
Use of violence	0.0816***	0.0444***	Working for government	-0.0329***	-0.00193
	(0.0143)	(0.0150)		(0.0109)	(0.0111)
Lands	-0.0447***	-0.0332***	Fractionalization	-0.0275	0.0305
	(0.00979)	(0.00973)		(0.0180)	(0.0671)
Agree with bribery	0.0826***	0.0532***	Catholic	0.00331	-0.0345
	(0.0137)	(0.0137)		(0.0132)	(0.0307)
Guerrillas	0.0507***	0.0603***	Commerce sector	0.0715***	0.0825***
	(0.0157)	(0.0151)		(0.0169)	(0.0162)
Justice into own hands	0.0899***	0.0384**	Own welfare	-0.00987	-0.0115
	(0.0138)	(0.0154)		(0.0135)	(0.0131)
Negative reciprocity	0.0812***	0.0397**	Age	-0.0148	-0.0144
	(0.0141)	(0.0161)		(0.0132)	(0.0146)
Rural population	0.0871***	0.0659**	Independent	-0.00280	0.0192
	(0.0163)	(0.0301)		(0.0141)	(0.0128)
Employment firms 2+	-0.0518***	0.0979***	Woman	0.0141	0.0234
	(0.0158)	(0.0333)		(0.0153)	(0.0170)
Education	-0.0585***	-0.0158	Polarization	0.0479***	-0.0145
	(0.0150)	(0.0167)		(0.0156)	(0.0546)
Other religion	-0.0294***	-0.0404**	Pop. density	-0.0280*	0.0572***
	(0.0107)	(0.0158)		(0.0155)	(0.0203)
Win margin	-0.0121	0.0394	Neighbor cellphones	0.0436***	0.0189
	(0.0287)	(0.0496)		(0.0158)	(0.0159)
State presence	-0.0686***	-0.0728***	Neighbor loans	0.0309**	0.0111
	(0.0153)	(0.0158)		(0.0148)	(0.0148)
Shock	0.0528***	0.0282**	Homicide rate	-0.108***	-0.105***
	(0.0129)	(0.0121)		(0.0172)	(0.0137)
HH expenses	-0.0575***	-0.0124	Gov. against inequality	-0.0108	-0.00292
	(0.0151)	(0.0148)		(0.0145)	(0.0151)
Popular vote	-0.0264*	-0.0217	Paramilitaries	-0.00929	0.00219
	(0.0139)	(0.0139)		(0.0132)	(0.0158)
Authorities violate law	0.0436***	0.00529	Positive reciprocity	0.00796	0.00139
	(0.0138)	(0.0141)		(0.0141)	(0.0142)
Workers by firm	-0.0653***	-0.0565**	Government role	0.00495	-0.00538
	(0.0146)	(0.0256)		(0.0144)	(0.0144)

Notes: Ordinary least squares regressions. The dependent variable of interest is a dummy indicating whether the respondent normally accepts buying items without a receipt, to avoid paying VAT. Region fixed effects are always included, and standard errors are clustered at the community level. Odd columns, labeled "bivariate," show the resulting coefficient for regressions including only one covariate at a time. Even columns show the coefficient for a multivariate regression, simultaneously including all variables listed in the table. For variable definitions, see Appendix Table B-1. * is significant at the 10% level, ** is significant at the 5% level, *** is significant at the 1% level.

Table B-6: Tax evasion: interaction terms: Simple regression analysis

	(1)	(2)
Variables	**Bivariate**	**Multivariate**
State presence × Positive rec.	-0.0206**	-0.0178*
	(0.0102)	(0.0104)
State presence × Negative rec.	0.00652	0.00358
	(0.0130)	(0.0130)
Popular vote × Positive rec.	0.0117	0.00888
	(0.0129)	(0.0126)
Popular vote × Negative rec.	0.00823	0.00472
	(0.0139)	(0.0136)

Notes: Ordinary least squares regressions. The dependent variable of interest is a dummy indicating whether the respondent normally accepts buying items without a receipt, to avoid paying VAT. Standard errors are clustered at the community level. Region fixed effects are always included, and standard errors are clustered at the community level. Column 1 reports the coefficient of a "bivariate regression" containing only the region fixed effects, lower-order uninteracted terms, and the interaction of interest as regressors. Column 2 presents the results of a multivariate regression in which all variables in Table B-5 are also included. For variable definitions, see Appendix Table B-1. * is significant at the 10% level, ** is significant at the 5% level, *** is significant at the 1% level.